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Abstract
A much-debated question in object recognition is whether expertise for faces and expertise for non-face objects utilize
common perceptual information. We investigated this issue by assessing the diagnostic information required for different
types of expertise. Specifically, we asked whether face categorization and expert car categorization at the subordinate level
relies on the same spatial frequency (SF) scales. Fifteen car experts and fifteen novices performed a category verification task
with spatially filtered images of faces, cars, and airplanes. Images were categorized based on their basic (e.g. ‘‘car’’) and
subordinate level (e.g. ‘‘Japanese car’’) identity. The effect of expertise was not evident when objects were categorized at
the basic level. However, when the car experts categorized faces and cars at the subordinate level, the two types of
expertise required different kinds of SF information. Subordinate categorization of faces relied on low SFs more than on
high SFs, whereas subordinate expert car categorization relied on high SFs more than on low SFs. These findings suggest
that expertise in the recognition of objects and faces do not utilize the same type of information. Rather, different types of
expertise require different types of diagnostic visual information.
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Introduction
An enduring question in object recognition is what defines
expert perceptual processes and how different they are from
regular, everyday object recognition. This question was amply
explored in the domain of face processing, a domain of natural
expertise in all human adults. Faces form a highly homogenous set
of stimuli with a very similar spatial configuration of parts.
Therefore, discriminating between individual faces and extracting
other relevant information from them should be, in theory, a
difficult perceptual task. Nonetheless, humans are extremely adept
in recognizing individual faces and categorizing faces along many
other subordinate dimensions such as race or gender. This
remarkable ability has been attributed by some to specifically
tuned neural mechanisms distinguished by behavioral [1],
electrophysiological [2], and neuroimaging [3–4] markers. Others
considered face perception as an extreme manifestation of
perceptual expertise [5–6], which may be generalized to objects
other than faces, specifically to objects that form a visually
homogenous category with a prototypical part configuration [7–
8]. The latter view challenges face specificity suggesting that
processing characteristics usually attributed to faces are a general
expression of expert visual processing rather than a peculiarity of
face recognition. The present study addresses this contended issue
by investigating the type of visual information utilized by experts
while recognizing objects of expertise, and whether such informa-
tion is different from expert processing of faces, on the one hand,
and from processing objects outside the domain of expertise, on
the other hand.
Several lines of evidence suggest similarities between the
manifestation of face expertise and accumulated expertise for
other real-world objects. First, similar to the individuation of faces,
experts tend to recognize objects from their domain of expertise at
a subordinate-level and do so with relative ease, in spite of the high
visual homogeneity of the exemplars within a category. This
tendency has been termed ‘‘the subordinate shift’’ [9] and has
been demonstrated by similar category verification speed for both
basic and subordinate levels [10–12]. The subordinate shift has
been reported in experts with various object categories [9,13–15]
as well as with faces [16–17]. Furthermore, it has been suggested
that objects of expertise, similar to faces, are processed in a holistic
fashion, that is, by integrating the parts of the object rather than
processing them independently from one another [7,18]. These
two properties, the subordinate shift and holistic processing, are
considered the hallmark properties of object expertise [19].
Second, several neuroimaging studies have shown that the
fusiform face area (FFA), a putative face-selective area, is activated
more strongly by objects of expertise than by other objects [8,20–
21], albeit other studies failed to find such an effect [22–25].
Finally, event related potential (ERP) studies showed that the
N170, an early negative occipitotemporal component that indexes
face processing (increasing in amplitude in response to faces
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compared to objects) may be modulated by expertise to non-face
objects [26–30].
Together, the studies presented above were considered support
for the notion that faces and objects of expertise share common
perceptual and neural mechanisms [31]. However, this view is
intensely debated [19,32] and several studies suggested that face
expertise and object expertise might utilize visual information
differently [33–35]. These studies describe manipulations that
impair face processing but not the processing of objects of
expertise. For example, Yue and colleagues [35] have shown that
whereas matching of faces was influenced by spatial frequency (SF)
manipulations, the matching of laboratory-created objects of
expertise (‘‘blobs’’) by trained experts was unaffected by identical
SF manipulations. This occurred even though the blobs were
specifically designed to resemble faces in their surface properties
and physical similarity. These findings putatively support a
computational model of face and object recognition proposed by
Biederman and colleagues in which objects of expertise (as well as
regular objects) are represented based on invariant features, free of
SF information whereas faces are represented holistically by a set
of spatially distributed V1-like filters that are sensitive to
orientation and SF content [36–37].
While the results of Yue and colleagues [35] are revealing, their
psychological reality is limited because they are based on artificial
rather than real-world objects (for a similar argument, see [38]).
Moreover, artificial objects, unlike real-world objects lack semantic
representations. This point is critical, as expertise could be
characterized by the ability to access relevant and meaningful
semantic information that is not available to non-experts [39,40].
Therefore, when studying face and object expertise it is necessary
to explore not only what kind of perceptual information is utilized
by observers that vary in their domain and level of expertise, but
also how this information interacts with the expert’s knowledge
and recognition goals. In fact, the lack of sensitivity to SF
manipulations in blob experts may have been confined to
situations that do not require the usage of specific SF scale
information, such as basic-level categorization [41].
Supporting this conjecture, Harel and Bentin [42] found that
categorization of faces and objects requires different SF scales and,
critically, that this differential utilization of SF information
depends on the level of categorization. Specifically, categorization
of faces at both basic and subordinate level was impaired by
filtering out low SFs from the image but was not affected when
high SFs were filtered out. In contrast, filtering out low or high SFs
equally impaired categorization of airplanes at the basic-level, but
subordinate categorization of airplanes was more impaired by
filtering out high SFs. This pattern implies that the use of
perceptual information in the image is determined by multiple
factors, primarily stimulus category, expertise with that category,
and also the level of the categorization. However, in that study the
processing of faces was not contrasted with the processing of other
objects of expertise and, therefore we could not establish whether
the differences in using SFs are specific to face processing or a
general manifestation of expertise.
To investigate whether expertise for faces and other objects
entails the usage of the same type of spatial frequency information,
in the present study we compared the categorization of faces, cars,
and airplanes by car experts and novices while explicitly
controlling for level of categorization. This design allowed us to
manipulate the factors that we suggest might affect the utilization
of SF information while processing visual images: the level as well
as type of expertise, and the level of categorization. The primary
theoretical interest concerned the utilization of SF information
within the car experts group at the level at which their expertise
might be expected to manifest, that is, at the subordinate level.
Expanding our previous findings, if face and car expertise utilize
the same type of perceptual information, we would predict that car
categorization in car experts would show a similar sensitivity to SF
manipulations as that found for face expertise. In this case,
categorization of cars by car experts at the subordinate level
should be more hampered by the filtering of low rather than high
SFs. Alternatively, if expert car categorization is based on different
diagnostic information than face expertise, a different pattern of
SF utilization should emerge. One possibility, for example, is that
expert car categorization will rely more on high rather than low
SFs, resembling everyday object recognition. Thus, the current
design enabled us to test whether expert recognition involves the
usage of common diagnostic information across categories, or
whether each type of expertise is manifested differently.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Fifteen car experts (all males, 21–42 years, M=26.4) and fifteen
undergraduate students from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem
(all males, 19–31 years, M=25.2) participated in the study, which
was conducted at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel.
They signed an informed consent according to the requirements of
the Ethics Committee of the Hebrew University and were paid for
participation. Approval was obtained from the Hebrew University
ethics committee.
The car experts were recruited among volunteers who
responded to a message posted in car forums on the Internet.
To assess their expertise, the candidates performed a same-
different car model recognition task inspired by Gauthier et al. [8]
(see details below), and an additional semantic task that was aimed
at assessing the extent of their knowledge and familiarity with the
cars presented in the model recognition task (not reported here).
Expertise in the current study was determined by scoring an
accuracy level of 83% or above in the car recognition task.
Furthermore, all self-defined experts displayed extensive knowl-
edge about car models in the semantic task. Importantly, all
‘‘experts’’ reported a life-long interest in cars and displayed
extensive knowledge about the cars presented in this study.
All the participants completed the expertise testing procedure
(same-different recognition tests with cars and airplanes) in a
separate session prior to the main experimental session.
Expertise Testing Procedures
On each trial of the same-different car-model recognition test,
participants determined whether two cars presented sequentially
(for 500 ms each with 500 ms ISI) were of the same model (e.g.
‘‘Honda Civic’’ or not). The two cars in each trial were always of
the same make (e.g. Honda), but were physically different, as they
differed in year of production, color, angle and direction of
presentation. Thus, while for ‘different model’ trials the two
images were of the same car-maker but different models (e.g. VW
Golf and VW Passat), for ‘same model’ trials the two images
depicted two cars of the same model but differed physically The
experiment consisted of 80 trials (40 ‘same model’ trials, 40
‘different model’ trials), which were based on 160 different car
images. No identical pairs or images were repeated throughout the
experiment. The car images were of frequently encountered
models from recent years. To assure that the car expertise
displayed by the car experts was category-specific, all participants
performed an analog experiment in which they were instructed to
match images of passenger airplanes. The passenger planes
experiment was prepared and displayed in the same manner as
Distinct Information Use in Car and Face Expertise
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 June 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 6 | e67024
the car experiment (e.g. based on 160 different airplane images).
The order of the trials within each experiment varied across
participants (for further details on the expert selection procedure,
see [24]).
Formal comparison of the experts’ performance with that of
novices was based on mixed-model, two-way ANOVA with
expertise (experts/non-experts) as a between-subjects factor and
object-category (airplane/car) as a within-subjects factor. Accuracy
rate (d’) was the dependent variable. This analysis showed a
significant interaction between the two factors (F(1,21) = 50.76,
p,.001). As expected, experts were highly more accurate when
recognizing cars (Mean d9=2.49, range = 2.04 to 3.58) compared
to airplanes (Mean d9=0.70, range= 0.12 to 1.16) while the
performance of novices was similar for cars and airplanes (Mean
d9=0.45, range=20.24 to 1.04 and Mean d9=0.41,
range =20.14 to 0.71, respectively).
Experimental Stimuli
The stimuli in the main experiment were 80 images of female
faces in front view, half Chinese and half Israeli, 80 images of cars
in side view, half of European makers and half of Japanese makers
and 80 images of airplanes in side view, half combat jets and half
passenger airliners. The models of cars that we selected are
frequently encountered in Israel.
All images where 3606360 pixels, which seen from a distance of
70 cm subtended a square of 9.9u69.9u at the center of the visual
field. The object image size, mean luminance and RMS contrast
were equated across categories. The background of all the objects
was a uniform gray equated to the mean objects luminance. The
original, broadband (BB) images were spatially filtered using a
Butterworth filter with an exponent of 4. The low-pass (LP) and
high-pass (HP) filter cutoff corners were 1 cycle/degree (,10
cycles/image) and 6.5 cycles/degree (65 cycles/image), respec-
tively. All together there were 720 different images, 240 in each
spatial filter condition. Examples of the stimuli in the different
spatial filters can be seen in Figure 1. The values of the HP and LP
filters were set to match previous studies (e.g. [43]). In order to rule
out effects induced by possible differences between categories in
the energy of different frequency bands after filtering, we
measured the energy of the stimuli across for each category in
each spatial frequency scale (Figure 2). Each image in the stimuli
set was Fourier transformed and its DC component was set to
zero. A rotational average of the Fourier amplitudes of each radius
in the plane was calculated. This yielded for each image a
distribution of energy across orientations as a function of spatial
frequency. The resulting spectra were then averaged separately for
each experimental condition (irrespective of the task-related
categorization level): faces BB, faces LP, faces HP, cars BB, cars
LP, cars HP, airplanes BB, airplanes LP, airplanes HP. As can be
seen in Figure 2, the values were roughly equivalent across
categories for each type of spatial filter.
Experiment Design and Procedure
Participants performed a category verification task in two
consecutive sessions. A trial started with the presentation of an
object category label presented for 500 ms at the center of the
screen. The label was followed by a fixation cross for 250 ms and
then by an image of an object exposed for 300 ms, and a blank
screen for 250 ms, after which a question mark appeared. The
question mark was the signal for the participant to initiate a
response (The delayed response procedure was imposed by the
concomitant recording of ERPs. These data will be reported
elsewhere). Randomly selected inter-trial intervals of 500, 800,
1000 ms separated the next trial from the response. Participants
were instructed to indicate by pressing one of two buttons whether
the object matched the category label or not. Accuracy rates and
reaction times (RTs) were recorded. RTs were measured from the
onset of the question mark. As the imposed delay of the responses
precluded drawing strong conclusions, the RT data is not further
reported. Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that the pattern of
results replicated the RTs in our previous study in which they were
measured from stimulus onset [42].
Throughout the experiment, the level of categorization was
blocked. Thus, basic level (face, car, or airplane) and subordinate
level (Chinese or Israeli face, European or Japanese car, civil
airliner or combat jet) category labels were presented in two
separate sessions administered consecutively, using the same
stimuli. Note that although each stimulus image appeared twice,
they were presented in two different sessions and separated by a
large number of trials, hence precluding any potential priming
effects. The order of the blocks was counterbalanced across
participants. A session consisted of five blocks, each consisting of
144 trials. The nine stimulus types (three categories and three
spatial filter conditions) were mixed in each block and presented in
random order. In half of the trials the image corresponded with
the preceding category label and in the other half the image did
not correspond with the preceding label. In the subordinate level,
images in the mismatch trials were from the same basic-level
category as the category label. For example, the category label
‘‘Chinese face’’ was followed by an image of an Israeli face. In the
basic level condition, mismatch images were from the two object
categories other than the object category label. For example,
following the label ‘‘car’’, an image of an airplane or an image of a
face appeared with equal probability. Each block of the
experiment was preceded by instructions and a training session
of 72 trials comprising of all the experimental conditions in equal
proportion.
Results
To assess the accuracy of categorization performance, a
measure of sensitivity (d’) was calculated for each experimental
condition. The d’s were calculated by collating the responses of the
participants for each trial (i.e., match/mismatch between the
category label and the image) and comparing it with the required
correct responses (match/mismatch between the category label
and the image). A mixed-model ANOVA with Group (car
experts/novices) as a between-subjects factor and Category
(faces/cars/airplanes), Categorization Level (basic/subordinate)
and SF scale (BB/HP/LP) as within-subjects factors was
performed. The analysis showed a main effect of Group
(F(1,28) = 59.30, MSE=160, p,.0001), Category:
F(2,56) = 67.46, MSE,1, p,.0001; Categorization Level:
F(1,28) = 160.00, MSE= 1, p,.0001, and SF scale:
F(2,56) = 49.26, MSE,1, p,.0001). All the interactions in the
experiment were significant (p,.01) other than the SF6Group
interaction (F(2,56) = 1.80, MSE,1, p..15).
As noted above, the crucial question outlining the current study
is whether car experts utilize SF information in a way that
resembles more face categorization or object (airplane) categori-
zation. As expertise in the recognition of both faces and objects is
primarily expressed at the subordinate level of categorization, our
following analyses focus on subordinate level categorization.
Indeed, basic-level categorization performance was highly accu-
rate across all SF conditions, with no significant interaction
between SF scale and Category in both the expert (F(4,56),1.00)
and novice group (F(4,56),1.00) (Table 1). This pattern is
Distinct Information Use in Car and Face Expertise
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consistent with many prior studies using the category verification
paradigm (e.g., [17,41]).
Stating with the novice group, the current results replicated our
previous findings with novices [42] demonstrating that subordinate
categorization of faces and airplanes rely on different types of SF
scales (novice subordinate car categorization was not further
analyzed due to its overall poor performance level (mean d’ = .24,
see Figure 3B)). Airplanes and faces showed opposite patterns of
SF utilization (F(4,56) = 37.03, MSE,1, p,.0001; Figure 3B).
Subordinate face categorization was significantly lower in its
accuracy relative to subordinate airplane categorization
(t(14) = 5.26, p,.001) when the lower SFs were removed from
Figure 1. Examples of stimuli used in the experiment. For cars (top row), Japanese makers are presented, and for airplanes (bottom row), civil
airliners are represented. Faces are not presented for privacy reasons. Stimuli are presented in the different spatial frequency scale conditions: BB (left
column), LP (center column) and HP (right column). Note that for presentation purposes the stimuli in the HP condition are presented using a slightly
lowered threshold.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067024.g001
Figure 2. Mean magnitude versus frequency plot of the spatial frequency spectra of the spatially filtered stimuli in the three object
categories (see text for details).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067024.g002
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the image (the HP condition). In contrast, subordinate face
categorization was significantly higher than the airplane subordi-
nate categorization (t(14) = 5.33, p,.001) when the higher SFs
were filtered out from the image (the LP condition).
Having established a double dissociation between faces and
objects (airplanes) in utilization of SF information, the following
question was whether subordinate car categorization in experts
would exhibit a similar sensitivity to SF manipulations as that
displayed in subordinate face categorization. As can be seen in
Figure 3A, this was not the case. Compared to the BB condition,
subordinate categorization of cars by the car experts was more
interfered by the removal of high SFs (mean difference = 1.25,
p,.001; Bonferroni corrected) than by the removal of low SFs
(mean difference = .50, p,.05; Bonferroni corrected) whereas
subordinate categorization of faces was hampered by the removal
of low SFs to a greater extent (mean difference relative to the BB
condition = .91, p,.001; Bonferroni corrected) than by the
removal of high SFs (mean difference relative to the BB
condition = .41, p,.05; Bonferroni corrected). A direct compari-
son of faces and car categorization reveals that when the higher
SFs were filtered out from the image (the LP condition)
subordinate car categorization was significantly lower than the
face subordinate categorization (t(14) = 7.93, p,.001). Thus,
information usage in expert subordinate car categorization shows
a different pattern of sensitivity to SF manipulations relative to that
of face subordinate categorization.
The pattern of information usage in the subordinate expert
categorization is clearly distinct from that used in face categori-
zation, and resembles in its higher reliance on the higher SFs the
subordinate categorization of airplanes. However, this may raise
the question of how specific is the pattern of information usage in
car expert categorization to the participants’ expertise, or whether
it reflects a general category difference in information usage,
similar to the difference found between face- and airplane-
subordinate categorization. To address this possibility, we
compared the subordinate categorization of cars and airplanes
under the different SF scales within the expert group. If the effect
of car expertise reflects information usage that is general to objects,
one should not expect a difference between car and airplane
subordinate categorization across the different SFs scales. Alter-
natively, a difference between airplane and car categorization in
experts would imply unique expert processing. To adjudicate
between these possibilities, a mixed-model ANOVA with Category
(cars/airplanes) and SF scale (BB/HP/LP) as independent
variables was performed. Critically, the Category by SF scale
was highly significant (F(2,28) = 9.48, MSE=1.23, p,.001),
implying a differential usage of SF information for the categori-
zation of cars and airplanes in experts. Follow-up analyses of this
interaction showed that car subordinate categorization was more
impaired the airplane subordinate categorization when the lower
SFs were removed (t(14) = 3.86, p,.005), but it was even more
impaired when the higher SFs were removed (t(14) = 11.83,
p,.0001). Thus, subordinate car categorization is unique from
airplane categorization, but this difference is quantitative, and not
qualitative, with greatest decrease noted when the higher SFs were
filtered out. Note that when all frequency scales are contained
within the image (BB condition), there was no difference between
car and airplane subordinate categorization (t(14) = 1.62, p..13)
implying same level of task difficulty for these two baseline
conditions (see next).
Finally, the pattern of results for the subordinate categorization
in the experts cannot be simply explained by differences between
categories resulting from task difficulty, as planned comparisons
showed no significant difference in expert baseline performance
(BB condition) between the three categories (F(2,28) = 2.45,
MSE,1, p,.11).
Discussion
The goal of the present study was to explore how naturally
developed expertise for faces and intentionally learned expertise
for cars manifest during visual object recognition. To achieve this
goal we compared the impact of expertise on the utilization of
image-based information (SF scales) for category verification of
faces, cars and airplanes while controlling for categorization level.
Specifically, our question was whether car expertise and face
expertise will utilize the same type of SF information when
categorized at a subordinate level.
The present findings revealed that expert subordinate catego-
rization of cars varied as a function of the SF content of the image
differently than faces. Whereas for faces the distinction between
Chinese and Israelis was less accurate when low spatial frequencies
were removed from the faces, for cars the distinction between
Japanese and European cars by car experts was substantially less
accurate when high spatial frequencies were removed from the
cars. Note that for airplanes, an object category of non-expertise,
the subordinate distinction was also worse when high spatial
frequencies were removed. This pattern of results, (i.e., the
difference between car expert recognition and face recognition in
SF utilization on the one hand and the putative similarity between
car expert recognition and subordinate object recognition, on the
other hand) suggest that expertise in the recognition of objects,
including faces, does not entail a unifying computational principle.
Rather, different types of expertise require different types of
diagnostic visual information.
Our choice of subordinate tasks in the current study might seem
at first non-intuitive. Expertise in face recognition is usually
considered to manifest at the individual exemplar level, that is,
Table 1. Basic-level categorization performance of novices and car experts (d’).
Airplanes Cars Faces
BB HP LP BB HP LP BB HP LP
Novices 3.55 3.48 3.52 3.56 3.66 3.62 3.49 3.76 3.70
(0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.20)
Experts 4.02 3.99 3.84 4.15 4.07 4.10 3.96 3.88 3.91
(0.14) (0.17) (0.19) (0.14) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.12) (0.16)
Basic-level categorization performance (mean d’) of airplanes, cars and faces at the different spatial frequency scale conditions for the novices and car experts.
BB = Broadband images; HP=High-pass filtered images, LP = Low-pass filtered images. Error bars represent SEM.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067024.t001
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discrimination of facial identity. Accordingly, it may be argued
that the choice of a race categorization task might not have tapped
the ‘‘true’’ nature of face expertise. However, while individuation
undoubtedly requires expertise, it may not be the only type of face
expertise. As proposed by Johnson and Mervis in their seminal
study of bird and fish experts [40], expertise can be expressed at
multiple levels of abstraction along the basic level to individual
exemplar level continuum. For example, bird experts can easily
distinguish between loons, ducks, and grebes (subordinate level)
but at the same time distinguish between a teal and mallard (sub-
subordinate), as well as between a redhead duck and a canvasback
duck (sub-sub-subordinate). In other words, while the individual
exemplar level may serve as the entry point (particularly in faces,
see [17]; but see [16]), there may not necessarily be a single
‘‘subordinate’’ level that captures expertise in its entirety. The
rationale for the use of the race categorization task in the current
study was our elaborate effort to match as much as possible the
face and the object expertise tasks. The subordinate distinction
between European and Japanese cars is non-trivial, and it was
designed specifically so that the experts will have to employ their
full recognition abilities (albeit at the unexpected consequence of
very low performance for the novice group). In terms of
categorization hierarchies, the face analog of the car subordinate
task is the distinction between Israeli and Chinese faces, as it is
more specific than the distinction between objects and faces but
less specific than individuation. Similarly, the distinction between a
civil airliner and combat jet is more specific than a basic-level
distinction, but at the same time does not require identification of
Figure 3. Subordinate categorization performance (mean d’) of the car experts (A) and novices (B). (A) Expert subordinate level
categorization of faces, airplanes, and cars at the different SF scale conditions. (B) Novice subordinate level categorization of faces, airplanes, and cars
at the different SF scale conditions. BB = Broadband images; HP=High-pass filtered images, LP = Low-pass filtered images. Error bars represent SEM. *
denotes significance value of p,0.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067024.g003
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individual exemplars. On a more general note, it should be noted
that the question of whether the level of specificity along the
categorization hierarchy interacts with object category and
stimulus information (i.e. what subordinate distinctions would be
considered a-priori as ‘‘equivalent’’ when comparing the catego-
rization of different object categories) has not received much
attention in the literature, and would greatly benefit from future
research [for further discussion, see 41].
In contrast to the dissociation between subordinate categoriza-
tion of faces and objects of expertise, basic-level categorization was
similarly high for both objects of expertise (faces and cars) and for
objects outside the domain of expertise (airplanes), in both experts
and novices, suggesting that expert-specific utilization of SF
information is manifest primarily at the subordinate level. While
this pattern might reflect ceiling effects, previous research suggests
that this caveat is not necessarily warranted. Since basic level
categorization is based on the recognition of the general shape of
the object [12,44] it is usually considered to be insensitive to spatial
filtering manipulations, as the general shape of the object is
retained in both low-pass and high-pass filters [41,45–46]. Thus,
the current pattern of results for the basic level condition is
congruent with this notion as well as with other studies in which
RTs were analyzed in addition to performance [41–42]. Further,
this pattern was also evident in a study in which noise was added to
spatially filtered images to circumvent potential ceiling effects [41].
Finally, previous training studies of expertise showed that superior
expert performance was manifest when the participants were
required to make subordinate level discriminations, but not when
they were required to make basic level ones [15,47].
The current findings are not in accord with previous studies of
expertise that proposed that expertise with different types of
objects involves the usage of similar perceptual information (cf.
[31]). This view was based on studies showing that face processing
is influenced by the concomitant processing of objects of expertise.
Thus, Gauthier and colleagues showed that the holistic processing
of faces in the context of cars was more interfered with when the
cars were presented in a normal orientation than when holistic
processing of the cars was hampered presenting them with their
top half upside-down. Importantly, the magnitude of interference
correlated with the level of car expertise. This was considered
evidence that, for car experts but not for novices, cars tap the same
holistic processing mechanism as faces [48]. Similarly, the face-
sensitive N170 potential, decreased in amplitude when car experts
viewed faces concurrently-presented with cars (relative to concur-
rently presenting two faces). This effect was not observed with
novices [27]. These results were proposed as evidence for a
functional dependence between face and object expertise, partic-
ularly in the usage of holistic information (see also [7]). However,
other studies of expertise in object recognition failed to find holistic
effects using known experimental paradigms from the face
literature, such as inversion effect, the composite effect and
contrast reversal ([33–34] but see [49]). These studies challenged
the notion that expertise with objects and face expertise utilize the
same type of perceptual (holistic) information. At the same time,
however, these studies did not address the actual process of
information utilization that occurs in expertise, leaving the
question of what is the nature of the diagnostic information in
expertise unanswered.
The present study fills in this gap by demonstrating that under
more or less equal recognition goals, car expertise relies primarily
on high SFs whereas face expertise relies on low SFs. Apparently,
when details are not required, expert object recognition involves
only the processing of the overall shape; this process was used for
both faces and cars. However, when finer discriminations are
required object recognition is dominated by the need to extract
diagnostic features, which are different for different categories
[50]. The diagnostic information required to distinguish between
Chinese and Israeli (Caucasian) faces was contained in low SFs
whereas the distinction between Japanese and European cars was
based on information contained mainly in high SFs. Although a
simple relationship between low and high SFs and holistic/featural
processing of visual information is contentious [51–54] details are
evidently absent from low-pass filtered images whereas the holistic
and texture information, although might be present, are more
difficult to discern when low SFs are removed. Therefore, the
present findings suggest that subordinate face categorization (at
least by race) requires information about the configuration of parts
and texture, whereas expert car categorization requires detailed
information about diagnostic parts. Hence, notwithstanding
controversies about how holistic and part information is contained
in different SF scales, when fine distinctions are required, experts
differ in the type of information utilized during visual processing.
Finally, it is important to note that our use of ‘‘high’’ or ‘‘low’’ SFs
in the current work is in a purely relative sense, and is used only to
infer the differential usage of SF scales. Put differently, the primary
concern of the present study is not what are the absolute SF scales
diagnostic for recognition of different object categories (as
measured in cycles per object), but rather whether the categori-
zation of faces and cars (in experts) is equally impaired by filtering
out particular SF scales. In this respect, our choice of specific cut-
off values was strictly utilitarian: We used SF cut-off values that
have been shown to be relevant for face and car recognition in a
prior study [43].
It is also important to note that the utilization of details was not
specific to subordinate categorization of objects of expertise. The
distinction between the two subcategories of airplanes has also
been based on details conveyed by high SFs. Since the participants
were not airplane experts the selective use of high SFs for this
distinction suggests that even non-experts could extract diagnostic
information selectively, based on their knowledge. This pattern
raises the possibility that the manifestation of expertise for cars in
the present study also reflected knowing what the diagnostic
features of the two subordinate categories were. For the
subordinate categorization of airplanes, this information is
probably common knowledge (see the long line of windows
characteristic to civil airliners) whereas for cars the knowledge of
the diagnostic features is probably acquired through experience. A
recent study investigating the long-term structural cortical changes
that are associated with increasing experience in car recognition
provides support for this conjecture [39]. We found that
experience in car recognition was positively correlated with
increasing gray matter density in prefrontal cortex. Based on this
finding, we hypothesized that acquiring perceptual expertise in a
specific category is accompanied by the acquisition of vast
personal visual knowledge related to that category, which leads
to the formation of enriched and distinctive visual representations
that are accessed and processed by prefrontal regions (see also
[24]). Finally, it should be emphasized that while there are
similarities in the usage of information for the categorization of
objects of expertise (cars) and objects of non-expertise (airplanes),
this does not necessarily mean that the two processes are identical.
Comparing the categorization of cars and airplanes by the experts
showed that a differential modulation of the two categories by SF
scale. While categorization of both categories was most influenced
by the removal of the higher SFs, the cars showed a greater
decrement than the airplanes, indicating a greater reliance on
details for categorization. Notably, this distinction between objects
of expertise and regular objects implies that the difference we
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found between faces and cars in experts cannot be reduced to a
general category effect (i.e., reflecting a similar SF profile
difference as the difference between faces and airplanes), further
suggesting that it is the combination of experience and category,
which drives the difference between the processing of faces and
non-face objects of expertise.
Conclusions
The present study demonstrated that when expertise is needed
to discriminate between members of a homogenous category, the
diagnostic information extracted from the image is determined by
the specific stimulus category. For faces, the diagnostic informa-
tion, at least for race distinctions was at the lower end of the SF
spectrum. For cars, the diagnostic information resided in details;
hence, the removal of high SFs impaired performance. This
pattern lead us to conclude that the impact of expertise on visual
processing is based on acquired knowledge about category specific
diagnostic details that are required for discriminating between
similar exemplars of subordinate categories. Whereas for faces this
knowledge might be applied by default [42] for other objects of
expertise it is applied only when it is instrumental, such as in
difficult subordinate categorization tasks.
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